ps aux | grep "simulation: nato_russia_wargames"
i was inspired by perun's video on wargames so i did some research
nato and russia military strategy (2022–2025): wargames, deterrence, and geopolitical shifts
strategic signaling through military exercises
military exercises have re-emerged as a key instrument of strategy and statecraft for both nato and russia since 2022. large-scale drills serve not only to train forces, but also to signal intent and resolve to adversaries and allies alike. for nato, the resurgence of high-profile exercises on its eastern flank – such as multinational war games in the suwałki gap linking poland and lithuania – demonstrates to moscow that the alliance is vigilant and ready . for russia, periodic “zapad” exercises (“west”) and other annual drills historically provided a stage to showcase military might and rehearse offensive scenarios against nato, doubling as deterrence signaling. in the tense climate after russia’s invasion of ukraine, these war games carry heightened significance. they can reassure nervous allies or rattle opponents, and both sides have leveraged exercises as show-of-force demonstrations. indeed, as one analyst notes, nato’s largest air power exercise ever (air defender 23) explicitly “sent the clear message that nato is serious in its renewed focus on collective defence”, underscoring the alliance’s unity and readiness in response to russia’s aggression . in short, military drills have become a form of strategic communication: a way to telegraph capabilities, test new war plans, and deter potential aggression through visible preparedness.
at the same time, exercises are invaluable for preparation and deterrence. nato has markedly increased the frequency and scale of its drills since 2022, improving interoperability and the ability to reinforce its eastern members on short notice. allied wargames practice complex tasks – from multi-national air defense to division-level maneuvers – that would be critical in a real conflict. the alliance’s latest exercises are explicitly designed to practice article 5 collective defense scenarios against a “near-peer” adversary . on the russian side, the armed forces have likewise used exercises to adapt their tactics and rebuild confidence despite setbacks in ukraine. however, moscow’s war in ukraine has also strained its exercise schedule. the flagship zapad-2023 drills were canceled because russian troops and equipment were tied up in combat . this underscores that, while war games are meant to project strength, they are also indicative of each side’s true military capacity. when russia resumed zapad in 2025 on a smaller scale, it served as a reminder that belarus has now effectively become a forward operating base for russia’s military – a strategic shift with serious implications for nato’s eastern flank . in sum, wargames have become a barometer of nato-russia postures, reflecting both sides’ deterrence messaging and real-world readiness under the pressures of the ongoing conflict.
nato’s evolving deterrence posture (2022–2025)
the outbreak of the russia–ukraine war in february 2022 galvanized nato into the most profound evolution of its defense posture since the cold war. within days, nato activated elements of its response force for the first time ever in a deterrence role, and allies surged troops, aircraft, and air defenses to the eastern flank . in spring 2022, nato established four new multinational battlegroups – in romania, bulgaria, hungary, and slovakia – supplementing the existing four in poland and the baltics, thereby expanding its forward presence to eight battalion-sized battlegroups on the eastern front . these battlegroups, each led by a framework nation, are positioned to make any aggression immediately engage nato troops from multiple nations, thus tripwiring a full alliance response. nato leaders also agreed these units could be scaled up to brigade-size formations as needed, and they put in motion a new force model to enable rapid reinforcement of the east . by 2023, nato was shifting from the “enhanced forward presence” tripwire concept to a robust forward “deterrence by denial” posture: aiming to have far larger high-readiness forces available and detailed regional defense plans for responding to russian aggression . at the 2023 vilnius summit, nato approved its first new regional defense plans in decades and announced a target of over 300,000 troops at high readiness, along with substantial air and naval assets, dedicated to defend against its “most significant and direct threat” – russia  . this marked a return to territorial defense fundamentals for nato, after years of out-of-area missions.
nato’s adaptation has also been visible in unprecedented exercises and deployments. in early 2024, the alliance launched steadfast defender 2024, the largest nato exercise since the cold war, mobilizing some 90,000 troops from all 32 member states (including new members finland and sweden)  . this sprawling multi-domain drill practiced the rapid reinforcement of europe by u.s. and canadian forces and tested nato’s new article 5 war plans in a simulated fight against a “near-peer” adversary  . as nato’s top commander gen. christopher cavoli noted, steadfast defender 24 rehearsed the execution of newly developed defensive plans “detailing how [nato] would respond to a russian attack” . the exercise involved over 50 naval vessels, 1,000 armored vehicles, and extensive air forces, signaling to moscow that nato can quickly mass overwhelming combat power to its eastern flank . nato airpower drills have grown as well: in june 2023, germany hosted air defender 23, the largest nato air exercise in history with 10,000 personnel and 250 aircraft. this drill enhanced allied air integration and practiced defending nato territory against drones and missiles, while sending a “concrete message of solidarity” that nato is ready to “defend every inch” of allied soil  . nato even conducted its annual nuclear strike exercise (steadfast noon) in october 2022 amid the ukraine war, underlining that its nuclear deterrent remained credible despite russian saber-rattling. across the board, nato’s force posture by 2025 features heavier forward presence, higher readiness, and upgraded plans – all geared to deter russia from any attack on allied territory.
another dramatic change has been nato’s enlargement and unity in response to the war. finland and sweden’s decisions to seek nato membership shattered decades of neutrality in northern europe. finland officially joined nato in april 2023, bringing a well-armed military and adding 830 miles of new nato border with russia . sweden followed suit in 2024, becoming nato’s 32nd member. these accessions have fundamentally altered the strategic map: the entire baltic sea coastline (save russia’s kaliningrad enclave) is now nato territory, and the alliance gains strategic depth in the high north. nato has quickly moved to integrate the nordic states; for example, plans are underway to station a new multinational battlegroup in finland by 2026 . the alliance is also leveraging nordic defense cooperation – finland and sweden already drill closely with norway, denmark, and iceland – to strengthen its arctic and baltic defense. the geopolitical signal is powerful: russia’s war has backfired by expanding nato and unifying it. nato’s political cohesion was on display at the 2022 and 2023 summits, where even historically hesitant nations boosted defense spending and supported forward deployments. in short, nato of 2025 is a far more alert and mobilized alliance, refocused on collective defense and deterrence of russia, with new members and capabilities bolstering its eastern shield.
russia’s military adaptations and challenges
russia’s military, meanwhile, has undergone painful adaptations as a result of the heavy losses and pressures of the ukraine war. by 2023, the russian armed forces had suffered tens of thousands of casualties and equipment losses, straining its pre-war active force. to compensate, the kremlin launched a “partial mobilization” in fall 2022, calling up roughly 300,000 reservists. this infusion of manpower stabilized russia’s front lines in ukraine but came at the cost of fielding many hastily trained, lower-quality troops. analysts in early 2024 noted that moscow’s mobilization efforts were only managing to replace losses at about a one-to-one ratio, often deploying new recruits with minimal training directly to the front  . the “generally low quality of new recruits” and inadequate equipment have limited russia’s offensive potential, forcing a shift toward more attritional tactics  . lacking sufficient well-trained forces for large-scale maneuvers, russia resorted to grinding, infantry-heavy assaults (as seen in places like bakhmut and avdiivka) supported by massed artillery – effectively trading lives for time and territory. this approach has yielded only incremental gains while inflicting enormous materiel losses. for example, in a single february 2024 assault near avdiivka, russian forces lost at least 54 armored vehicles (including 16 tanks) in one day, losses attributable in part to poor troop quality and rigid tactics . these setbacks have pushed the russian military to adapt on multiple levels: from replacing sacked generals and overhauling command structures, to embracing cheap drones and loitering munitions for reconnaissance-strike, to fortifying defensive lines in occupied ukraine against expected ukrainian counteroffensives.
under the surface, moscow has also initiated long-term military reforms aimed at expanding and modernizing its forces – though these plans face serious constraints. in late 2022, defence minister sergei shoigu outlined an ambitious expansion to 1.5 million personnel (from about 1.0–1.15 million pre-war) over the next few years  . as part of this reform, russia is recreating the old moscow and leningrad military districts (which had been merged in 2010) to better divide responsibility for ukraine and nato-facing forces  . in february 2024, president putin officially split the western military district accordingly: a new moscow md now oversees forces fighting in ukraine, while a re-established leningrad md is tasked with an “anti-nato posture” in the northwest following finland and sweden’s nato accession . along with this, shoigu announced formation of new units, including a new army corps in karelia (near the finnish border), several new motorized rifle divisions, and airborne divisions . reports indicate russia is indeed building up military infrastructure near finland: satellite imagery shows new garrisons and depots under construction on the karelian isthmus and kola peninsula, and a karelia army corps of 15,000 troops is in the works . by these plans, the leningrad md (responsible for the baltic and nordic frontier) could grow from around 30,000 pre-war troops to 100,000 troops and hundreds of additional tanks in the coming years . this represents a direct russian response to nato’s northern expansion – essentially beefing up forces opposite finland and the baltic states. however, skepticism abounds as to whether russia can achieve these expansions on schedule. the ongoing ukraine war continues to consume the best of russia’s ground units and equipment, limiting what can be rebuilt for a hypothetical future conflict with nato. moreover, training and integrating large numbers of new conscripts or contract soldiers will be difficult given the combat attrition of russia’s professional nco corps and officer cadre.
crucially, western sanctions and export controls have started to bite into russia’s military-industrial capacity, forcing adaptations in procurement and technology. a 2025 study by chatham house finds that russia’s defense industry is “struggling to build genuinely new and technologically advanced systems” and has been reverting to soviet-era legacy designs due to the inability to access high-tech components  . many of russia’s precision-guided weapons and communications systems relied on western electronics, now largely cut off. in response, moscow has become heavily reliant on third-party suppliers (often via illicit networks) to obtain critical microchips and optics, while attempting some import substitution domestically . this has led to visible changes on the battlefield: for instance, russia has sourced iranian-made drones (shahed kamikaze uavs) to supplement its missile strikes, and it has pulled old stocks of t-62 and t-55 tanks out of storage to refit for use as the supply of newer tanks dwindled. despite a surge in defense spending, russia’s military industry is in a state of regression – able to keep churning out “good enough” armaments to sustain the war, but falling further behind western state-of-the-art technology . analysts predict russia will have to simplify and downgrade its weapons production in the coming years, accepting lower quality and less sophisticated outputs . already, evidence suggests production of certain high-tech munitions (like advanced cruise missiles) has slowed, while factories focus on volume of basic artillery shells and rockets. in short, russia is adapting by “muddling through” – making do with older designs and external help – which may suffice for an attritional war in ukraine but raises doubts about its ability to compete with nato’s advanced militaries in the long term .
exercises in focus: steadfast defender 2024 and zapad war games
amid these shifts, specific high-profile exercises on each side illustrate the evolving strategies and serve as case studies in strategic signaling. on nato’s side, exercise steadfast defender 2024 stands out as a landmark demonstration of the alliance’s post-2014 transformation reaching full maturity. conducted from january through may 2024 across europe and the atlantic, steadfast defender was “nato’s largest military exercise since the end of the cold war” , bringing together over 90,000 troops from all member nations (plus sweden as an invitee). its core purpose was to practice nato’s new collective defense plans for a high-intensity war – essentially a dry run of the article 5 response to russian aggression . the exercise scenario focused on rapidly reinforcing nato’s front-line states. u.s. and canadian brigades deployed across the atlantic and rushed eastward, testing the alliance’s ability to move heavy forces quickly into a conflict. more than 50 allied ships (including carrier strike groups) and some 80+ combat aircraft participated, underscoring that any conflict with nato would engage its full multi-domain might . gen. cavoli (saceur) noted that steadfast defender 24 put nato’s new “force model” to the test by stress-testing the coordination of large formations and logistics under wartime conditions . the exercise also linked several national drills (e.g. poland’s dragon-24 maneuvers and the u.s.-led defender europe 24 series) into one overarching scenario  . the strategic implications were clear: nato showcased an unprecedented level of preparedness and interoperability. the message to moscow was that any attempted attack on nato would be met not by a fragmented response, but by a unified, largescale, and swift collective defense. as one nato summary put it, steadfast defender 2024 was a “clear demonstration of our unity, strength and determination to protect each other” – a deterrent signal as much as a training event  .
russia, for its part, has long used its quadrennial “zapad” war games as both a military rehearsal and strategic theater. zapad (russian for “west”) exercises typically occur every four years and simulate a conflict with nato along russia’s western borders. the last full iteration, zapad-2021, was one of the largest soviet/russian exercises in decades – by russian claims, around 200,000 personnel were involved across multiple regions. strategically, zapad-2021 served to intimidate nato and mask real operational preparations. western analysts later concluded that elements of zapad-2021 provided cover and practice for the very invasion of ukraine launched in february 2022 . troops that participated in joint drills in belarus during zapad and subsequent exercises (allied resolve 2022) went on to spearhead the assault on kyiv, exemplifying how moscow blurred exercise activities with actual combat deployments. the war in ukraine then disrupted russia’s exercise calendar: zapad-2023 was canceled, as the russian general staff had to devote all available units to the ukraine front . this was a notable break, indicating the strain on russia’s forces – it could not even mount its flagship western md exercise without risking front-line readiness. by zapad-2025, russia revived the tradition, albeit on a smaller scale than 2021 . these drills, conducted jointly with belarus in september 2025, carried important signals. they underscored belarus’s deepening role as a forward staging area for russian forces, with new permanent infrastructure (bases, depots, training camps) built on belarusian soil since 2022 . in essence, minsk has traded away neutrality and allowed itself to become an extension of russia’s military theater – a message not lost on poland and the baltics, which went on high alert during zapad-2025. strategically, the zapad exercises illustrate russia’s focus on preparing for a conflict with nato even amid the ukraine war. each iteration provides moscow a chance to refine lessons (for example, integrating electronic warfare or rehearsing mobilization of reservists) and to telegraph its own deterrence signals – often accompanied by nuclear posturing or aggressive rhetoric about “defending against nato provocations.” nato observers have learned to watch zapad drills closely for indications of russian operational concepts and any escalatory moves (for instance, in 2025 nato monitored for any spillover drone or missile incidents during the exercise, given a recent russian drone incursion into polish airspace  ). in summary, steadfast defender and zapad in this period became emblematic exercises, each encapsulating their side’s strategic stance: nato’s commitment to collective defense and russia’s intent to project strength despite military setbacks.
geopolitical consequences: nordic accession, eastern europe, and nuclear posture
beyond the immediate military realm, the 2022–2025 period has brought significant geopolitical shifts affecting nato-russia dynamics. foremost is the enlargement of nato to the nordic region, which has altered the strategic calculus for both sides. finland’s nato accession (2023) more than doubled the alliance’s direct frontier with russia, placing a nato border just 200 kilometers from st. petersburg and alongside key russian bases on the kola peninsula. sweden’s accession (2024) similarly plugged a geographic gap in the baltic sea, effectively turning that sea into nato’s inner waters. these moves have strengthened nato’s position in northern europe – for example, finland brings europe’s largest artillery force and a border that can tie down substantial russian troops. unsurprisingly, moscow has reacted with threats and military adjustments. almost immediately, the russian defense ministry announced plans to beef up forces near finland, resurrecting the moscow and leningrad districts and deploying new units to the northwest  . by mid-2025, construction activity was detected at russian bases in karelia and around murmansk, and russia stood up new brigades (engineer, artillery, air defense) in its arctic region  . a new army corps in karelia is expected to add 15,000 troops opposite finland once fully formed . in the kaliningrad exclave, russia also reportedly reinforced missile units and iskander ballistic missiles aimed at nato’s baltic members. nordic nato membership has thus spurred a mini arms race in the high north. that said, finland and sweden’s integration into nato also enhances deterrence: russia now faces a united nordic-baltic front, with joint air patrols and coordinated defenses from the arctic circle to the black sea. this reduces moscow’s room for coercion in northern europe, as even hybrid actions (like airspace violations or naval incidents) will encounter a collective nato response rather than isolated national reactions.
the war has also galvanized eastern european countries to take on a greater role in regional security. poland, the baltic states, and other front-line nations have been blunt in assessing the russian threat and have pushed nato to adopt a more robust stance. many of these countries have sharply increased defense budgets – poland, for instance, ramped up defense spending to about 4% of gdp in 2023 and embarked on a massive military modernization (acquiring u.s. abrams tanks, f-35 fighters, himars rockets, as well as korean k2 tanks and k9 howitzers) to build what its leaders call “the strongest land forces in europe.” the baltic states have been urging and hosting more nato troops; by 2023, each baltic nation had an expanded nato battlegroup and frequent rotational deployments of u.s. and british forces. romania and the black sea countries likewise have seen a boost in nato presence (e.g. a new brigade-sized french-led nato contingent in romania). these moves reflect an eastern flank consensus that russia’s aggression must be met with forward defense. as a lithuanian official quipped, eastern europe has become “nato’s defense laboratory,” pioneering new approaches like territorially integrated allied units and total defense concepts . in response, russia has engaged in periodic sabre rattling against these states – from aggressive air intercepts over the baltic, to using belarus to simulate attacks near poland. tensions spiked in mid-2023 when russia transferred some tactical nuclear warheads to belarus, in the first forward deployment of russian nuclear weapons outside its borders since the cold war. moscow justified this as a response to nato’s “encroachment,” but it was widely seen as a form of nuclear intimidation aimed at poland and lithuania.
indeed, the conflict has prompted adjustments in nuclear posture and rhetoric on both sides. president putin and other russian officials have repeatedly brandished the threat of nuclear escalation, hoping to deter nato from direct intervention in ukraine or from providing certain high-end weapons to kyiv. within weeks of invading ukraine, russia put its strategic nuclear forces on a higher alert status and conducted exercises of its nuclear triad (the “grom-2022” drill in october 2022 practiced launching nuclear-capable missiles) . throughout 2022 and 2023, the kremlin’s messaging oscillated between asserting “we will use all means to defend russia” and downplaying intentions to actually use nukes unless nato attacked russia first. however, to keep nato off balance, putin in november 2024 approved amendments to russia’s nuclear doctrine lowering the threshold for first use . these amendments added ambiguous new scenarios in which russia might employ a nuclear strike – clearly an attempt to “amplify western fears” and make nato think twice about any direct clash  . western analysts assess that while the doctrinal tweaks do not radically depart from russia’s existing stance (which already allowed nuclear use in a losing conventional war), they form part of moscow’s ongoing coercive strategy – using the threat of nuclear escalation as a shield for its conventional shortcomings . by contrast, nato’s nuclear posture has remained steady and defensive. the alliance has emphasized that its nuclear sharing arrangement (with u.s. gravity bombs stationed in europe and dual-capable aircraft) is purely to deter nuclear attack, not to compensate for russia’s conventional war. nato did carry out its scheduled “steadfast noon” nuclear exercise in october 2022 even as putin raged, signaling that it would not be cowed by nuclear blackmail. furthermore, nato countries have become more unified in rejecting russia’s nuclear intimidations – by 2023, western officials noted that each kremlin nuclear threat garnered diminishing effect, as nato continued to arm ukraine and reinforce its own defenses despite moscow’s bluster . in summary, the nuclear dimension remains a backdrop to nato-russia military strategy: russia is leaning more on nuclear deterrence as its conventional forces suffer, while nato underscores its own resolve and modernizes its nuclear deterrent (e.g. deploying new f-35s to carry nukes) to maintain a credible counterweight.
conclusion: from 2022 to 2025, the military interplay between nato and russia has been profoundly shaped by the ukraine war, leading to a new era of deterrence and geopolitical confrontation. nato has undergone a historic refocus on collective defense – expanding its membership, forward-deploying more forces, and conducting bold exercises to show that it can deter and, if necessary, defeat any russian attack  . russia, while bloodied in ukraine, has adapted by mobilizing additional troops, fortifying its western approaches, and resorting to asymmetric tools (from iranian drones to nuclear sabre rattling) to shore up its position  . military exercises and wargames have been front and center in this standoff. they serve both sides as proving grounds and propaganda: nato’s steady drumbeat of exercises assures its members and warns moscow, whereas russia’s drills aim to project that it remains a potent adversary despite its setbacks. the broader strategic landscape has shifted as well – neutral countries have joined nato, eastern europe has armed itself in earnest, and the specter of nuclear escalation looms in the background. while a direct nato-russia clash has been avoided so far (in part due to effective deterrence), the period has been one of ever-increasing preparations for worst-case scenarios. as 2025 closes, nato and russia find themselves in a hardened adversarial posture reminiscent of the cold war, yet also markedly different: this time nato is larger and more unified, and russia is economically isolated and militarily bruised. both continue to engage in high-stakes signaling – through exercises, deployments, and rhetoric – to uphold deterrence and avoid miscalculation. the coming years will test whether these measures are sufficient to preserve peace, or whether the unprecedented pressures unleashed since 2022 will lead to a further escalatory spiral in europe’s security landscape. the only certainty is that each side will remain vigilant and prepared, eyes on the other, war-gaming every possibility in hope that demonstrating strength will prevent having to use it.
sources: nato, reuters, atlantic council, rusi, chatham house, house of commons library, usip, icds